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Tort Law and Environmental Risk
MARSHALL S. SHAPO*(©

I.

Introduction

It is plain that tort law cleans up messes. It provides
remedies to those injured by the activities of others that fit
into various categories of culpability and analogous
classifications.
In performing this remedial function, tort necessarily involves the assessment of risk after the fact. It also provides
guidelines to actors about the general categories of risk creation concerning which the law will provide remedies in the
future. It does not, however, provide a systematic assessment of the risks of particular activities in a forward-looking
way.
Despite this lack of a systematic, ex ante approach to risk
assessment, tort is an important element in the social response to environmental hazards. Even with a proliferation
of environmental laws and regulations, tort law is sometimes
the first line of legal protection for persons threatened, or injured, by such hazards. When there is a meaningful regulatory base, tort plays a "gap-filling" role. Always, it provides a
signal of the limits of propriety in the creation of chemical
and other risks in the environment. In doing so, it incidentally provides a mirror of what our culture tolerates concerning injuries to resources that are either literally not
renewable or are especially vulnerable to harm.'
* Marshall S. Shapo is Frederic P. Vose Professor at Northwestern University School of Law. The author appreciates research support from the
Charles C. Linthicum Fund.
1. See generally Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts
Scholarship Can Teach Us About the American Experience, 89 N.W. U. L. REV.
1567 (1995).
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A problem that tort law shares with its regulatory cousins -

and that tort analysis shares with economics -

is rela-

tivity of judgments about risk assessment. A 1996 issue of
Scientific American includes an article dealing with the government's proposed storage of high-level radioactive waste
under the Nevada desert ridge called Yucca Mountain. In the
course of his analysis, the author observes that "[tihe question of whether nuclear waste can be safely stored at Yucca
Mountain naturally prompts another query: What exactly is
meant by 'safe?'" He points out that "It]hat question cannot
yet be answered," noting that "the DOE [Department of En2
ergy] is working toward an as yet undefined standard."
What could be a more portentous example of the problem of
risk assessment common to all participants in this
discussion?
II. The Common Law
A handful of liability theories provides both swords and
shields for environmental interests menaced or injured by
risky activity.
A. Negligence
Negligence, a frequently used bandage for injury victims,
is conduct that falls below the standard of care of reasonable
persons in a particular activity. Courts apply the concept
both independently and as a subcategory of the doctrine of
nuisance. The very breadth of the doctrine renders it susceptible to a variety of interpretations, including those of riskutility analysis, its sibling cost-benefit analysis, and a more
distant cousin, that of cost-cost analysis.
Besides drawing on these tests, all redolent to one extent
or another of ideas of efficiency and of putting resources to
their highest and best use from a utilitarian point of view,
negligence law necessarily draws on notions of morality. It
asks not only what is efficient, but what is right. Its answers
on that score may vary with reference to the game that is
2. See Chris Whipple, Can Nuclear Waste be Safely Stored at Yucca Mountain? 274 Sci. Am. 72, 77 (June 1996).
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being played - one with a damages stake or one where an
injunction is at issue.
In seeking to determine whether conduct is reasonable,
negligence law asks whether that activity has exposed persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. 3 It makes a judgment
not only about the dollar value of injuries sued upon, but also
about the worth of the activity at issue. 4 In this sense,
although often it judges intuitively, it necessarily engages in
an assessment of the character of a risk. That is, it makes
value judgments. Arguably, these judgments are both prospective and retrospective. In deciding whether a defendant
acted reasonably, a court will use foreseeability as an important measure. Thus, it will ask how the defendant would
have assessed the risk before taking it. Yet there also is an
opportunity for the court to make an ex post social judgment:
to determine, after sifting through the event itself, whether
the risk was a reasonable one.
B.

Strict liability

Strict liability doctrine under the Rylands model, 5 now
extrapolated and more or less codified in sections 519 and 520
of the Second Restatement,6 is a principal tool in the kit of
tort remedies for environmental harms. The Restatement offers a catalog of factors as the matrix for decision. 7 Professor
Christie has ably criticized this approach, complaining of the
broad range of discretion it provides to courts.8 There is,
however, another side to the story. Factor analysis permits
3. This general standard appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 282 (1965).
4. The Restatement specifies as one of the factors for determining "the
utility of the actor's conduct for the purpose of determining whether the actor is
negligent" "the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be
advanced or protected by the conduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 292(a) (1965).
5. Originating in Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R. - H.L. 330 (1868).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977).
7. See id. § 520.
8. See George Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DuKE L.J. 747, 766770 (1986).
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judges to do what they are supposed to do - "to exercise
judgment." 9
However broad the warrant of courts dealing with environmental complaints under the strict liability doctrine, they
must engage in a rather delicate process that turns out to be
a process of risk assessment. They must weigh factors that
include the degree of risk, the likelihood of severe injury and
the defendant's "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise
of reasonable care." Courts also must balance the value of
the activity against its potential for harm, and assess its "appropriateness ... to the place where it is carried on" as well
as judging the "extent to which ... [it] is not a matter of com-

mon usage." 10
I spell out this familiar list to emphasize what may seem
an elementary point. I suspect that even rather sophisticated
lay persons - maybe even academics without the academic
side of their brain fully in gear - think of "risk assessment"
as focused tightly on the character of the danger itself. But
the perspective of tort law, just like the perspectives of economic theory and of formal regulation, assesses risk in
context.
Tort may do surprisingly well in this regard. It outpaces
economic analysis because it permits itself to crank more factors into the decision. Moreover, because of the intensity of
focus it brings to bear on individual situations, it provides a
specificity of analysis that even relatively precise regulations
frequently cannot attain.
A Seventh Circuit case involving a chemical spill is an
exemplar of the richness of argument that tort law fosters
concerning the application of strict liability to the accidental
release of toxic substances in the environment. At issue in
IndianaHarborBelt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co. ' 1 was a
leak of perhaps 5,000 gallons of acrylonitrile, a major industrial chemical described as "flammable at a temperature of 30
9. See Helene S. Shapo & Marshall S. Shapo, Law School Without Fear84
(1996)[hereinafter Law School Without Fear].
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520.
11. Indiana Harbor R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 635 (N.D.
Ill. 1987), rev'd, 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
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degrees Fahrenheit or above, highly toxic, and possibly carcinogenic." 12 The spill occurred in the IHB's Blue Island
freight yard near Chicago. The plaintiff was the railroad,
which paid almost a million dollars in decontamination costs
incurred by order of the Illinois Department of Environmental Protection. It sought reimbursement from Cyanamid, the
shipper of the chemical.
The shadings in how one might describe the consequences of the accident are evident in the descriptions
presented in the two reported opinions that dealt with the
case. District Judge Moran, who held for the plaintiff on the
basis of strict liability, characterized the spill as having
"forced the temporary evacuation of about 3,000 people" and
described it as having "contaminated not only the ground, but
also the water beneath it, thus threatening the water supply"
of several communities. 13 Judge Posner, who reversed the
district court's decision, pointed out that "[t]he evacuation
lasted only a few hours." Noting that the spill had not been
as great as originally feared, he described the state agency's
cleanup order as having been issued because it was
"[c]oncerned nevertheless that there had been some contami4
nation of soil and water."1
The two opinions identified different bases for what were,
after all, their respective risk assessments. Judge Moran,
noting that Louisiana law was relatively lenient concerning
chemical spills, observed that "chemical plants such as Cyan5
amid's... play an important part in Louisiana's economy."1
He concluded, however, that "[t]he value of acrylonitrile did
not outweigh the serious risk of harm to" the homeowners
who lived near the Blue Island freight yard. 16
Judge Posner, digesting statistics with relish, pointed
out that acrylonitrile was "fifty-third most hazardous on the
list" of "the 125 or most hazardous materials that are shipped
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

IndianaHarborBelt R.R.,
IndianaHarborBelt R.R.,
Indiana HarborBelt R.R.,
Indiana HarborBelt R.R.,
Id.

916 F.2d at 1175.
662 F. Supp. at 637.
916 F.2d at 1175.
662 F. Supp. at 644.
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in highest volume on the nation's railroads." 17 Identifying
with equal relish what he saw as a weakness of the argument
of plaintiffs counsel, he declared that to accept the district
court's judgment would render the top 52 most hazardous
chemicals subject to strict liability, and "quite possibly.., the
72 that rank lower as well."18 Noting that Chicago was a major railroad hub, Judge Posner stressed that it would probably involve "prohibitive cost" to reroute shipments of
hazardous chemicals "around all the metropolitan areas in
the country," an observation that he parlayed into the argument that it "weaken[ed] still further the case for imposing
strict liability on shippers whose goods pass through the
densely inhabited portions of the state."' 9
If there were risk assessments both implicit and explicit
in this analysis, however, the most striking one appeared in
Judge Posner's apparent delectation of the comparison of the
alternatives of "rerout[ing] the shipment of all hazardous
materials around Chicago" with "the relocation of homes adjacent to the Blue Island switching yard to more distant suburbs."20 He commented that "[b]rutal though it may be to say
it, the inappropriate use to which land is being put in the
Blue Island yard and neighborhood may be, not the transportation of hazardous chemicals, but residential living." 2 ' This
is risk assessment in the grand manner - that is, a value
judgment about risks. At its best, tort law is very good at
that.
C. Private nuisance
"There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law," Prosser famously remarked, "than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.'" The term, he continued, "has
meant all things to all men."22 In an analogous observation
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
1971).

IndianaHarborBelt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1178.
Id.
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1181.
Id.
See WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
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during an unusually discursive disquisition, a comment to
the Second Restatement nuisance sections remarked that the
23
term "frequently is used in several different senses."
Whatever else it may mean, however, the phrase "private
nuisance" connotes an "invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land" that violates some legal
standard defined in the traditional terminology of the law of
torts. Specifically, the Restatement requires a plaintiff to
show that the invasion was "either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under
the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless con24
duct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities."
The concept of nuisance therefore is approximately as broad
as the traditional culpability spectrum of tort law. However,
with its concept of "intentional and unreasonable," it appears
to create a kind of intentional torts-plus category. This is because it apparently requires the plaintiff to meet not only the
requirement of "intent" as knowledge with substantial certainty that an invasion will take place but also the require25
ment that the conduct be "unreasonable."
Especially given its inclusion of a separate strict liability
alternative, the Restatement formulation provides room for
plaintiffs to show that the risk created by the defendant went
beyond socially acceptable limits. The conduct may be negligent, presumably incorporating the broad social definition of
utility mentioned above. 26 Or it may be "abnormally dangerous," including among other things the notion of inappropriateness to the location mentioned in the Restatement's
27
definition of such activities.
The much-cited Boomer case 28 indicates how broad a
warrant nuisance law gives courts with respect to the value
judgments inherent in any risk assessment. In that case,
there was a stipulation that the damage caused by the de23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A, cmt. b (1979).

Id. § 822.
Id.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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fendant cement plant to the plaintiff landowners was
$185,000, which compared triflingly with the defendant's investment in its plant of more than $45,000,000 and its payroll
29
of more than 300 employees.
Committed to denying a full-dress injunction, even one
whose effective date was postponed to give the defendant a
chance to eliminate the pollution by "technical advances," the
court instead chose a compensation remedy. 30 It did issue an
injunction, but one to be vacated on the payment of permanent damages.
Reviewing Boomer after more than a quarter century,
one is struck by its broad frame of reference in terms of the
subject of this panel. The court explicitly folds in the regulatory dimension with its observation that "the amelioration of
air pollution will depend," in part, "on a carefully balanced
31
consideration of the economic impact of close regulation." It
insists that "[a] court should not try to do this on its own as a
32
by-product of private litigation."
With this pronouncement, the court obviously sets limits.
With its modest remedy, however, it defines potentialities.
Perhaps speaking of "gap-filling" is insufficiently descriptive.
At the least, tort becomes the spear, the point person - even,
the irritant that provokes change. It is symbolic that Boomer
33
was contemporaneous with the Clean Air Act of 1970,

which represented a quantum jump in federal control of air
pollution. 34
Boomer also blends in a pragmatic reference to what we
now classify as "law and economics." Anticipating Calabresi
and Melamed,3 5 the court points out that "[t]he parties could
29. See id. at 873 & n.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 871.
32. Id.
33. See Pub. L. No. 91-604 (1970).
34. The Congressional Quarterly Almanac termed the legislation "the most
comprehensive air pollution control bill in U.S. history." 1970 Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 472.
35. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089
(1972) (classifying nuisance rules that include a property rule favoring the
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settle this private litigation at any time if defendant paid
36
enough money."
At the time, the vogue for the application of economic
analysis to law was only in early bloom. I recall vividly wandering into a panel at an AALS annual meeting in the early
seventies. A young law professor was holding forth on law
and economics in the environmental milieu. An older member of the panel sat listening with a beatific papal smile, or
perhaps the smile of the proverbial cat that ate the canary.
And that, my friends, was Ronald Coase. The insights of
Boomer in both directions - its acknowledgment of the primacy of existing regulation and its quietly understated advertence to the importance of where one assigns the property
right - have now been absorbed into the mainstream of legal
thought.
Yet that is still only the beginning of the analysis. It appears that environmental law may yet have to come to terms
with the fact that regulation waxes and wanes. While a crop
of regulatory statutes may literally change the landscape for
a time, new revolutions in government may gut enforcement
if not eliminate the legislation. In that event, tort remedies
- sometimes facilely condemned for their asserted uncertainty - may actually provide an anchor where regulation
37
proves a will-o-the-wisp.
The main point with reference to this discussion is that
when we speak of tort and environmental risk assessment,
tort not only comprehends the insights of law and economics,
but it also responds -

because it must respond -

to the

problems of calculating and defining risk that are at the
heart of our highly articulated systems of government regulation. Boomer illustrates the linkage between the identificaplaintiff, under which presumably, the polluter must buy the plaintiff's property right in order to continue polluting, as well as a liability rule that permits
pollution but requires compensation).
36. See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873.
37. See A.BA.., The Special Committee on the Tort Liability System, ToWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 10-190 (1984)(Marshall S. Shapo Rptr.) [hereinafter JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY].
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tion of risk and risk assessment. Through the unique prism
of judicial remedies, it shows that risk assessment for one
purpose, the injunctive remedy, may be different from that
for another - the damages remedy. The risk is a given; at
each level of law as well as through the lens of economic analysis, the assessment will vary.
D.

Public nuisance

A quarter century ago I chaired a panel of this section
that included commentary pivoting on the law of public nuisance.38 One finds relatively little case law since on the subject - more's the pity, since the Restatement sections on the
topic went to so much trouble to explore its conceptual nooks
and crannies. 39 But whatever the popularity of the doctrine
as a pleading vehicle, the Restatement's definitions make
clear in both language and concept that public nuisance is a
leading exercise in risk assessment. If you are the sort of
lawyer whose instinct is to protect your wallet when you encounter a catalog of factors, you will want to make sure it is
safely tucked away when you read that "[c]ircumstances that
may sustain a holding" of public nuisance "include the following."40 You will become even more suspicious when you find
that the catalog features language like "a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public
38. The panel of the Torts Round Table Council for 1970 discussed a paper
by Willard Pedrick entitled, "Nuisance Law: A Stave or a Reed?" The panelists
were Professor William Rodgers, then as now a faculty member at the University of Washington School of Law, Charles Lettow of the general counsel's office
of the Council on Environmental Quality, Chicago attorney Charles Whalen,
and Dean John Wade, then assuming his duties as the second Reporter for the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Association of American Law Schools, Proceedings of 1970 Annual Meeting, Part Two, at 13. In a letter to Mr. Whalen, I
indicated my hope that, although the "point of departure" for the panel was
'common law public nuisance theory," I hoped that this would "trigger a freefor-all that will bring the discussion quickly to the intersection of public remedies with private law." Marshall S. Shapo, letter to Charles E. Whalen, Nov.
24, 1970.
39. A dozen pages of commentary and examples accompany the blackletter
on the substantive doctrine and the issue of who can recover in Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 821B-821C (1979).
40. See id. § 821B(2).
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peace, the public comfort or the public convenience," 41 not to
mention the words "the actor knows or has reason to know,
has a significant effect upon the public right."42 But this language - crafted by one of our greatest intellectual progenitors in the torts community - simply tries to spell out the
painfully wrought result of a process of legal development
that worked its way through centuries of common law.
E. Trespass
It is incumbent on me to mention the doctrine of trespass, not only for the sake of categorical completeness among
the common law doctrines, but because of its stark power as
what might be described an anti-risk assessment theory.
Trespass is the strictest of strict liability torts. One who intentionally causes something to go onto another's land - intent being defined according to the general definition of
substantial certainty that "entry of the foreign matter" will
result -

is liable for trespass. 43

Trespass provides a bracing contrast to "risk assessment," for it does not balance. It is interesting to find the
single paragraph or two on trespass that typically appears toward the end of many convoluted CERCLA cases. 44 The significance of those paragraphs lies in the very fact that
alongside the heavily lobbied balancing of CERCLA law even compared with the law of negligence and Rylands-type
strict liability - trespass is direct and brutal. One might call
it pre-figured risk assessment.
III.

The Role of Tort in Environmental Risk
Assessment

Because we think of tort in terms of cleaning up messes,
and because we are taught from our professional birth as law
students that private law does not do well as a comprehen41. Id. § 821B(2)(a).
42. Id. § 821B(2)(c).
43. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 & cmt. 1 (1965).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205, 1209
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
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sive regulator, 45 we may not give tort law sufficient credit for
its contribution to risk assessment.
As we assess that contribution, we must remember how
unavoidably value-laden is any process of assessing risks.
Large scale regulatory structures seek to cast particularized
assessments in stone. When one examines the level of detail
in CERCLA 46 one is struck by how closely legislators and regulators do that job in situations that permit doing the job
closely.
Where tort often helps to do justice is in precisely the
most difficult of cases, in those with the most uncertain outcomes, and in those where regulation is least informative or
even non-existent. As I explained in a brief critique of the
gallant effort of the American Law Institute's Enterprise Liability Project to carry off an "institutional analysis," 47 one
cannot count on this rowdy and complex society to put tortlike events in neat institutional boxes and keep them there. I
identified this as the "Problem of the Missing Tsar," pointing
out the perfectly obvious fact that Americans have no Tsar. 48
Let me now return to the case of nuclear waste and
Yucca Mountain. Why, a decade after the Government decided on Yucca Mountain as its chosen repository, would a
knowledgeable commentator say that the question of "[w]hat
exactly is meant by safe?" "cannot yet be answered?" The
reason is that scientific risk assessment may be as unavoidably value-laden as legal risk assessment. When well-qualified experts argue over whether the time limit for
containment should be 10,000 years or "until [the reposi45. For illustrative recognition of this point, see Jurisprudence of Injury,
supra note 37, at 14-10 ("in many areas involving deliberate social resource allocation, tort law provides no more than useful analogies"); Law School Without
Fear, supra note 9, at 11 (distinction between private law and public law), 99
("courts generally are deemed best able to deal with 'interstitial' questions...").
46. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 85 F.3d
1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996) (interpreting statutory definition of "facility").
47. See American Law Inst., Reporters' Study, Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury (1991), e.g., Vol. 2 at 3-15 (developing "comparative institutional
perspective").
48. See Marshall S. Shapo, The Problem of the Missing Tsar, 19 Hofstra L.
Rev. 185 (1991).
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tory's] risk begins to decline - even if that means a million
years" 4 9

-

then we know that the sort of risk assessment

that torts teaches provides a model for the boiling down of
decisional choices that must be made on the grandest scales.
Yucca Mountain is an evocative example of the power of
the tort model, indeed the private law approach, to clarify
analysis. The article to which I have referred reports that
"([from the very beginning . . . the state of Nevada has
strongly opposed the project." 50 However thin the tissue of
risk on which opponents rely, one can imagine the public sentiment that underlies the political opposition. There is plenty
of risk analysis literature that shows how seemingly "irrational" people can be about comparative risks, 51 but politics
in a nuclear world must take account of a rationality kinked
by the indelible image of the mushroom cloud.
A thoughtful professional ancestor of ours summarized
the point aphoristically in an article on the technical question
of nuclear licensing. Writing of a controversy over the siting
of a reactor in a Pennsylvania county, he referred to an
Atomic Energy Commission study's assertion that "in the
long run, it is effective performance which is the firmest foundation for public confidence." David Cavers' comment on this
sugary statement was that "in the interim the people to the
leeward of Peach Bottom are entitled to confidence that for
52
them there will be a long run."

Now consider, if you will, a citizen suit - founded on one
or more of the several centrally common law vehicles I have
mentioned or based on the quasi-common law doctrine of public nuisance - to enjoin the storage of nuclear wastes at
Yucca Mountain. Assume some appended claims from Ne49. See Whipple, supra note 2, at 77.
50. Id. at 72. The two United States senators from Nevada led opposition to
a bill to establish the Yucca Mountain site, which produced 37 negative votes,
enough to keep a predicted Presidential veto from being overridden. Warren
Leary, Senate Backs Atomic Dump; Veto is Likely, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1996, at
A7.
51. See, e.g., William A. Freudenberg & Julie A. Rursch, The Risks of "Putting the Numbers in Context": A Cautionary Tale, 14 Risk Analysis 949 (1994).
52. See David Cavers, Administrative Decision Making in Nuclear Facilities Licensing, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 330, 341 (1962).
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vada landowners for the newly fashionable fear-of-disease
tort. Invoking Karen Silkwood,5 3 I will also ask you to assume that the plaintiffs are able to overcome any defense of
federal preemption.
When that case reaches the highest court that writes an
opinion, the technical infighting will be fierce. Some of the
most fascinating punching and counterpunching will take
place over the application of the discretionary function excep54
tion of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
I suggest two things relevant to this discussion that will
be evident when that court publishes its opinion. First, tort
law is the ultimate refuge of the threatened citizen. Second,
the decisive paragraphs in that opinion, whichever way it
goes, will reduce to a tort-like formula the risk assessment
that decides the case.
Let me close on a mischievous pedagogical note, perhaps
one that you will privilege for a colleague who has taught
torts -

and thus necessarily taught environmental law -

for

31 years. Since the decisive passage of the opinion I have described will probably be no longer than a typical bluebook answer to a one hour exam problem, I will give you an
assignment. Sometime before January 6, 1998, write that
passage.

53. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (10th Cir. 1984).
54. A principal weapon for the government will be Allen v. United States,
816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying discretionary function exception to
injuries ascribed to atomic bomb tests).
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